



DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 341
March 1997
ATTAINMENT IN SECONDARY SCHOOL
L. FEINSTEIN and J. SYMONS 
ABSTRACT
This paper studies attainment in secondary schools. We estimate an
education production function in which attainment depends upon
parental inputs, peer group inputs and schooling inputs. We find that the
most powerful parental input is parental interest in children, as assessed
by teachers. We find a strong peer group effect. The school pupil-teacher
ratio does not enter significantly. The only strongly endogenous variable
is initial attainment. We argue that this is due to measurement error. There
is some evidence that parental interest is endogenous but we do not find
peer group variables to be so.
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ATTAINMENT IN SECONDARY SCHOOL
L. FEINSTEIN and J. SYMONS 
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper estimates an education production function to test the
importance of peer group and other inputs for educational improvement
in secondary schools. We find evidence of strong peer group effects, as do
Robertson and Symons (1996) for a parallel study of primary education.
We also consider the channels for the impact of general socio-economic
variables such as paternal occupational class. We find that variables
indicating parental interest in the education of their children generally
drive out the family background indicators of social class, family size and
parental education. 
There has been much concern recently about the achievement (or
otherwise) by British children of set standards in education. This has run
in tandem with continuing debates about the role of selection by schools
and of expanding choice for parents. Economists have applied theoretical
models developed in human capital theory to education in order to shed
light on the complex set of factors that influence the attainment of
children. The centre-piece of this theoretical apparatus is the education
production function which enables structural models of inputs and
outputs to be developed and tested. 
Many psychologists and educationalists, however, stress the inter-
connectedness of variables. Inputs to a production function might
themselves be outputs or choice variables from other structural
relationships. For example, a peer group might be considered to be an
input to education through the effects of role models, learning interactions
between children or as a description of the task facing teachers. On the
other hand, membership of peer groups is controlled both by schools and
by parents: schools often select children by ability and other criteria and
parents select schools either directly or by location decisions. More
subtly, some psychologists have pointed out that the ability to gain entry
to a good peer group (or to develop beneficial relationships within one)
2is to some extent an attainment produced in the family environment (see,
for example, Parke et al (1992) for a selection of papers on such issues).
Thus, membership of a good peer group can be considered an output of
earlier production (as, for example, by psychologists in the tradition of
Bowlby, 1969). Clearly, then, the association between peer groups, family
variables and performance is complex, characterised by considerable
endogeneity. For this reason, writers in other disciplines have stressed the
value of ecological models (Bronfenbrenner, 1979) or multiple pathways
(Schneider, 1993) that consider the inter-relatedness of inputs and
outputs. Thus, one of our aims in this study is to test the applicability of
a structural econometric model to children’s attainment in school. 
We test for the endogeneity of peer group inputs including school
type and ability stream, as well as the social class of the school’s peer
groups. We control for standard social class variables and consider how
peer groups and parental interest in education provide channels for family
variables to influence attainment. The data considered are provided by the
NCDS and are based on an initial survey of all children born in the UK
between March 3—9, 1958. Further sweeps were carried out when the
children were 7, 11, 16, 21 and 31, giving information on the academic
attainment of those children who remain in the survey. Sample children
entered secondary education in 1969 when the education system in the
UK was undergoing considerable change. Selection by examination,
formerly widespread, was gradually being replaced by non-selective
comprehensive schools. Clearly choices of schools by parents render peer
groups endogenous, but this is compounded when schools choose
children by examination. To some extent, this is evaded by controlling for
early attainment. The NCDS provides a number of  useful peer group
variables as well as family background variables and measures of
attainment. 
In the next section we describe the theoretical framework and
introduce the variables used to describe inputs and outputs. We present
the results in Section 3.
3
42. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical concept underlying our analysis is the educational
production function. Attainment is generated by family inputs,
conventional schooling inputs and peer group inputs. We follow
Hanushek (1992) in writing 
At = f (At-1 , Ft , St , Pt)
where At denotes attainment at date t, Ft refers to family inputs during
period t, St denotes schooling inputs and Pt denotes peer group effects.
One can think of this as a value-added formulation: the inputs at t act on
initial attainment At-1 to produce attainment at t. Robertson and Symons
(1996) adopt this framework to study attainment in primary schools in
NCDS data.
Measures of attainment
The dependent variables in the analysis are Reading and Mathematics
ability at 16, as well as an index of overall exam performance in all
subjects. The NCDS administered tests in both Reading and Maths. We
use the NCDS mathematics score at 16 as our measure of attainment. We
found, however, low discriminatory power in the reading test: about one
third of the population scored in the top seventh of the reading scale.
Robertson and Symons (1996) encountered a similar problem in analysis
of the tests at age 7. As our measure of attainment in Reading, we use an
index of highest grade attained in national examinations in English at any
time. 
We construct a value-added model using NCDS scores of Reading
and Maths at age 11 as lagged dependent variables in the Reading and
Maths regressions. Ideally, the lagged dependent variable is true
attainment at age 11. Since a test score inevitably contains measurement
error (with respect to true attainment) some instrumentation is required.
5Measures of parental inputs
Parental inputs are commonly found to be immensely significant in
determining attainment. This finding goes back at least as far as the
Coleman Report (1966). (See Haveman & Wolfe (1995) for a
comprehensive discussion.) There are a number of channels for parents to
influence their children’s educational performance. These have often been
classified as measures of the amount of time devoted to children and
measures of the educational quality of that time. Hanushek (1992) finds
that attainment decreases with family size and explains this using Becker’s
theory of time allocation within the family (Becker, 1991). As Haveman
and Wolfe highlight, it is also generally found that children of parents
with high levels of schooling perform better than children with less
educated parents. This might be due to the transmission of genetic
endowments or to environmental factors such as the higher educational
quality of the time of educated or able parents. It is also normally found
that children from higher social classes perform better but the channels
for this effect remain somewhat uncertain. One hypothesis is that this
reflects superior ability, controlling for education, of those in higher
occupational groups, this superior ability then being reflected in better
child raising. Parents can also influence attainment by provision of study
material (an example of a financial effect of social class) and indirectly by
providing incentives and discipline. Presumably these latter effects
become more important in secondary education.
The NCDS has recorded teachers’ impressions of the interest parents
take in the progress of their children at ages 7, 11 and 16, available
separately for mothers and fathers. One pleasant feature of the parental
interest variable is that it seems likely to be correlated with parental time
spent with the child, a more conventional economic input to a production
function. Hanushek (1992) makes an important distinction between
‘public’ and ‘private’ time of parents. Public time refers to the
establishment within the household of a common environment comprised
of attitudes towards learning, ambition, morality, language etc.  Private
time refers to active parental involvement with the education of specific
6children, correcting homework, for example. A plausible interpretation of
the parental interest variable is as a proxy for Hanushek’s ‘private time’.
Public time, however, seems likely to be associated with parental
education and social class. Thus regressions containing both proxies
possibly enable comparison of the relative importance of public and
private time as well as evaluating the direct factor input of parental
interest.
The parental interest variables suffer from potential problems of
endogeneity. Parents may show high levels of interest in children who do
exceptionally well at school: for example, they might regularly attend
parent teacher evenings to bask in reflected glory. On the other hand,
parents of children who do unexpectedly badly might attend PTA
meetings to see what can be done to improve their child’s performance.
Thus endogeneity bias can go either way.
In principle, working women have less time to spend on their
children. Robertson and Symons (1996) find in NCDS data that, while
the children of working women have lower attainment at 7, the increase
in attainment between 7 and 11 is unaffected by the mother’s labour force
status. A fortiori, one expects to find no effect between 11 and 16. Hill
and Stafford’s (1980) time diary study finds that the reduction in time
devoted to adolescent children by working women is quite modest. In the
empirical work (discussed below) we performed some experiments with
mother’s labour force status, finding no consistent effects.
Measures of schooling inputs
Variables such as class size and teacher experience are usually found to
have little effect on attainment. Hanushek (1986) provides an extensive
discussion of this evidence. Some recent studies have found more positive
evidence. Card and Kreuger (1992) showed that the returns to education
across states in the US are correlated with state-wide educational
expenditure. The STAR experiment in Tennessee shows significant
benefits of smaller classes but these seem to occur only for fairly dramatic
reductions in class size and mainly in the first year. The difficulty of
7finding an effect of class size on attainment is curious at first glance. It is
popularly believed that children perform better in small classes and if
pushy parents choose schools with low class sizes as well as fostering
development in unobserved ways, apparently significant correlations
should be easy to find. The problem appears to be that schools tend to
put children who are performing badly in smaller classes. For example,
top streams in the NCDS are significantly larger than bottom streams. To
some extent this endogeneity problem can be reduced by using the pupil-
teacher ratio (PTR) as a general measure of the school’s endowment of
teachers. However, it is usually found (Darlington and Cullen, 1982) that
PTR itself is wrongly signed in attainment regressions. The reason is
perhaps analogous to the placement of less able children in small classes
within given schools: it may be that schools in deprived areas seek or are
given low PTRs, reflecting their particular teaching and disciplinary
needs. Thus the Ofsted Report (1995) finds that Local Education
Authorities in inner-urban schools in the UK tend to have lower pupil-
teacher ratios than other schools. This problem should be offset by
controlling for social class and peer groups but other problems remain.
Darlington discusses the problem of separating teaching from
administrative time. The quality of teaching is also a key variable that is
unmeasured in the NCDS.
Measures of peer group inputs
The Coleman Report emphasises the importance of a child’s peer group
for attainment, but these findings have been controversial. See Smith
(1972), Averch (1972) and Hanushek (1971, 1972). More recently
Summers and Wolfe (1977) and Henderson et al (1978) have found
positive peer group effects, as have Robertson and Symons (1996). In
other contexts peer group effects have been found to be important in
teenage pregnancy and school drop-out behaviour (Evans et al, 1992).
Educational theory provides support for peer group effects. For example
Foot et al stress the importance of strengthening teaching interactions
between children. 
8The NCDS has a number of measures of peer group at age 16. Four
were used in this study: the proportion of children in the class with fathers
in non-manual occupations, the proportion of children in the class only
taking GCE examinations, the proportion of children in the class only
taking CSE examinations and the proportion of children from the previous
year’s class who stayed on in education after the then minimum leaving
age of 15. We constructed a single peer group index as the sum of these
variables (the CSE proportion entering negatively). The index was scaled
to range between 0 and 1. 
We include school type (grammar, comprehensive, secondary
modern, private) as a peer group input. In general, the intake of grammar
schools and secondary moderns at the time of the tests was determined by
examination. These schools were gradually being replaced, as noted
above, by (non-selective) comprehensive schools. Endogeneity problems
arise from choices by parents and choices by schools. In the first place,
ambitious parents will tend to choose good peer groups for their children
as well as helping them in other unobserved ways, perhaps not captured
by the parental interest variables. Secondly, if some schools are better
than others in ways observed by parents but not by the NCDS, these
schools will have positive control over their selection intake. The peer
group effect will then be conflated with the unobserved school quality.
Table 1 shows the proportion of cohort members in different school
types. In 1974, at age 16, 59% of the NCDS cohort members attended
comprehensive schools. Because the number attending special schools
was low we exclude the dummy variable on special schools in the analysis
below.
Table 1: School Type and Streaming
% streamed
No % English Maths
Comprehensive 7454 58.5 75.5 83.3
Grammar 1347 10.6 50.4 82.0
Secondary Modern 2738 21.5 68.7 77.0
Private 764 6.0 49.2 77.9
9Special 446 3.5 28.3 30.0
Total 12749 100
Of course, school type does not only represent peer group inputs but
also reflects the reverse causal link between pupil intake and curriculum.
Secondary moderns, for example, were intended to meet the educational
and future occupational requirements of less academically able children.
We expect these children to do less well in exams, partly reflecting the
lower expectations and perhaps motivation of teachers in these schools.
However, since entrance to grammar schools and secondary moderns was
based on selection by examination at 11, these schools do also provide
very homogenous intellectual peer groups.
As well as school type itself, ability groups within schools also
create peer group effects. Table 1 shows that streaming was much more
common in comprehensive schools than elsewhere. A pupil in a high
stream receives good peer group effects as well as advanced instruction.
These advantages are to some extent controlled for in our analysis by the
peer group variable itself but we do include dummy variables for the
pupil’s stream. These variables will be endogenous if pupils who show
unexpected development between 11 and 16 tend to be allocated to a
high stream.
Instrumentation
It is possible to argue for the endogeneity of nearly all right hand side
variables in socio-economic analysis of the kind conducted here.
However, the scarcity of instruments limits the amount of endogeneity
that can be handled. We will focus on measurement error in the lagged
dependent variable and reverse causality in the parental interest and peer
group variables. Finally, we instrument PTR because it is a choice variable
for parents and schools.
To deal with the measurement error in early attainment we
instrument attainment at 11 using teachers’ assessments of children’s
abilities. Additionally, in the Maths equation the lagged Reading score
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enters the instrument set and vice versa. The use of teachers’ assessments
of the child at age 11 as instruments is open to the objection that teachers
might have better knowledge of a child’s future attainment than is
revealed by the test at 11. This would invalidate use of the assessments as
instruments. We use a Sargan test (Sargan, 1988) of the orthogonality of
instruments and equation error to assess the use of these and other
instruments. 
To instrument average parental interest between 11 and 16 we use
mothers’ and fathers’ interest at 7. Local Authority dummies are used to
instrument for peer groups and PTR. This requires some discussion. The
appropriateness of instruments is related to the source of potential
endogeneity. We consider here the peer group variables, though very
similar remarks could be made about PTR. If, as argued above, ambitious
parents choose good peer groups for their children as well as helping them
in other ways, then the peer group parameter will be biased upwards if
peer group is treated as exogenous. The question then is whether
especially ambitious parents are likely to be clustered in certain areas: if
so, geographical variables are inappropriate as instruments. However,
since we control for social class and parental education, the question
becomes whether a family of given social class and education is likely to
be more ambitious for its children in Wandsworth, say, than in Clapham.
Brooks-Gunn et al (1993) discuss various ways in which parental
ambition, aptitude in household production and location might be related.
For example, parents who consider themselves able to counteract the
negative effects on attainment of living in an economically deprived area
are more likely to choose to locate there. Alternatively, parents unable to
re-locate are more likely to be found in such areas. The direction of
whatever bias there may be is therefore uncertain. Robertson and Symons
(1996) conclude that location effects are not an important source of bias,
though their analysis is conducted for larger geographical areas. In their
analysis of peer group effects described above, Evans et al (1992) use
variables measuring local area deprivation as instruments for peer group.
Again, the Sargan methodology offers a test of our instruments.
As stated above, endogeneity can also arise because of the choices
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of schools: if certain schools are good in ways observed by parents but
unobserved in our data (for example, because of a good headmistress)
these schools may ‘cream’ the best students. This means that the peer
group effect is conflated with the unobserved school quality. The question
is then whether such unobserved quality, unrelated to observable school
type and peer group, is correlated with Local Authority area. We do not
find this compelling.
3. RESULTS
In Table 2 we present IV estimates of production functions for attainment
in English, Maths and for the overall index of examination success. We
treat parental interest, peer groups and PTR as exogenous. (In Table 4 we
shall report a test similar to Hausman (1978) supporting the exogeneity of
our peer group variables.) Inputs are loosely classified as family, peer
group or schooling variables. A dummy variable for gender is also
included. 
In these regressions we have instrumented the lagged dependent
variables for the errors in variables reason set out above. The parameters
obtained for Maths, English and All Exams are 0.47, 0.62, and 0.57
respectively, as against 0.31, 0.46, and 0.46 without instrumentation.
These changes are very significant by the Hausman criterion, providing
support for the hypothesis of measurement error. The proportional bias is
given by the ratio of the measurement error variance to the variance of
observed lagged attainment. (In the multivariate case the denominator is
the variance of the residuals from the regression of lagged attainment on
the other exogenous variables.) This enables calculation of the magnitude
of the standard deviation of the measurement error. We find these to be
7.7, 9.1, and 6.0 for English, Maths, and All Exams, respectively. These
numbers seem to give fairly plausible 95% confidence intervals for test
scores.
Of the family inputs, only parental interest has a consistently strong
impact. In contrast to what is usually found, social class, family size and
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parental education are not generally significant. We performed chi-
squared tests for the exclusion of these seven variables in each of the three
equations, obtaining values of 2.8, 16.1 and 21.7 for English, Maths and
All Exams respectively. Thus, only in the All Exams regression do we find
joint significance of the seven background variables at the 1% level. It is
not clear what is the appropriate test size with such numerous data. In any
event, the seven SES variables have relatively small effects on All Exams
results: the combined effect of coming from a high social class with
parents who stayed on in school after 16 is still only 5.33 percentage
points compared to an effect of 21.59 from moving from no parental
interest to the highest level of interest. The correction for measurement
error plays a role here. If this correction is not made, initial attainment is
biased down and the regression acquires more of the nature of a cross-
section in which these variables are stronger. The fact that parental
interest far outweighs social class in these regressions suggests that, in
Hanushek’s terminology, private time is more potent than public time in
fostering attainment in children. In any case, it is clear that the interest
parents take has a strong effect on the education of their children
Recall that parental interest is measured as the average of mother’s
and father’s interest. When entered separately, mother’s and father’s
interest attracted roughly equal parameters: the average of the two is
therefore a convenient simplification. It will also minimise the number of
endogenous variables requiring instrumentation. When a parent was
absent from the family, that parent’s interest was set to zero and a dummy
variable was introduced in the regressions in Table 2. The parameter on
the parental absence dummies thus estimates any effect of an absent
parent beyond that channeled through missing parental interest. These
dummies were never significant at the 5% level, so it follows that the
effect of absence of a parent who takes (or would have taken) maximum
interest is represented by half the parameter on parental interest in Table
2, while the absence of a parent taking minimum interest has no effect at
all. Note that the former effect is significant and important in magnitude.
The peer group variable is very strong, as is being in the top stream
of a streamed school. The parameter on the dummy variable ‘streamed
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school’ measures the effect of being in the bottom stream. Thus, a pupil
in the bottom stream for English scores 4.60% less than a student in a
non-streamed school (and 8.66% less than a student in the top-stream),
ceteris paribus. The mixed school parameter measures the average
advantage to boys of being in a mixed-sex school. This tends not to be
significant. However, girls in mixed schools do worse than in single sex
schools although the effect is only significant for English. Grammar
schools appear to have a strong positive effect on performance relative to
the default group, comprehensive schools. We also observe a negative
effect of secondary modern attendance, especially for English. Attendance
at private schools is nowhere significant.
The pupil-teacher ratio has a negative effect on attainment but is not
significant in any of the three regressions. As commonly found, girls
perform better than boys in English and worse in Maths. Girls perform a
little better than boys in overall academic attainment but not significantly.
We tested a number of variables in this model to represent effects
from the neighbourhood (non-school peer group effects). Both at the level
of the Local Authority (average population about 300,000) and at the
level of the OPCS Enumeration District (average population about 460),
we tried the unemployment rate, the proportion of unskilled manual
workers, the proportion living in council housing, and the proportion of
immigrants. Only once was the parameter correctly signed and significant
(the All Exams regression for the unemployment rate measured at the
L.A. level). We conclude that the school provides by far the most
influential peer group.
Table 2: Attainment at 16
English Maths All Exams
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Score at 11 0.47 13.6 0.62 30.4 0.57 13.9
Parent quality and time inputs
Father in top SES 0.95 0.9 1.26 1.5 2.30 1.8
Father in middle SES 0.19 0.3 0.19 0.3 -0.32 0.4
Father stayed on at school 0.73 0.9 0.43 0.7 1.35 1.4
Mother stayed on at school -0.32 0.4 1.25 2.1 1.68 1.9
Number of older children -0.14 0.6 -0.50 2.4 -0.61 2.0
Number of younger children -0.15 0.5 0.03 0.1 -0.15 0.4
Father plays a role in upbringing 0.28 0.3 -0.12 0.1 -0.75 0.6
Parental interest 13.22 5.2 10.11 4.7 21.59 6.8
Peer group inputs 
Peer group 7.57 3.4 6.67 3.6 9.32 3.4
Top stream 4.06 5.4 5.59 9.0 5.98 5.6
Streamed School -4.60 3.8 -2.81 2.7 -3.20 1.7
Grammar School 5.92 4.5 2.90 2.8 6.73 4.2
Secondary modern school -3.64 4.5 0.73 1.0 -1.91 1.9
Private school 2.34 1.2 -0.37 0.3 -0.03 0.0
Schooling inputs 
Pupil-teacher ratio -0.16 1.0 -0.02 0.2 -0.07 0.4
Gender (=1 if girl) 6.75 5.1 -2.83 2.8 2.35 1.5
Mixed School 1.00 0.9 0.64 0.7 -1.09 0.8
Girl in mixed school -4.03 2.8 -2.01 1.8 -2.00 1.1
Constant -7.94 2.0 8.75 1.38 1.39 1.8
R-squared 0.51 0.65 0.63
Number of observations  2514 3234 2429
Notes: i) All dependent variables are scaled to take values between 0 and 100. “All Exams” is
a composite index of school examination results. Peer group and parental interest are scaled to take
values between 0 and 1.
ii) In the “All Exams” regressions, score at 11 was represented by the average of Maths
and English scores. Dummy variables of ability streams of both English and Maths were required.
iii) When parental interest at 7, 11, or 16 was missing, either because it was unreported
or a parent was missing, it was set to zero. Dummy variables were introduced for missing mothers and
fathers as well as for genuinely unreported observations at 7, 11, and 16 (12 dummies in all). These
are not reported.
iv) Maths and English scores at 11 are treated as endogenous and instrumented by the score
in the other subject (Maths by English and vice versa) as well as teachers’ assessments at 11.
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Channels for the transmission of parental inputs
The finding that social class and family inputs other than parental interest
do not have important effects on attainment is partly to be expected in an
improvement regression. Early effects of parental inputs are channeled
through attainment at 11. Mainly, however, this is due to the effects of
parental interest and peer group. If these variables are excluded the other
family variables become much stronger and generally significant. It is
interesting to consider the determination of the peer group and parental
interest variables. Table 3 shows the results of these regressions.
Table 3: Channels for Parental Inputs
Parental interest at 16 Peer Group
Father Mother
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Father in top SES 0.12 12.1 0.14 12.4 0.13 15.4
Father in middle SES 0.04 5.6 0.05 6.2 0.02 3.8
Father stayed on at school 0.08 10.2 0.09 10.0 0.09 13.3
Mother stayed on at school 0.09 13.9 0.08 10.0 0.08 14.0
Number of older children -0.04 17.7 -0.05 16.5 -0.01 7.7
Number of younger children -0.03 11.3 -0.04 10.7 0.01 5.3
Mother works 0.01 1.7
Father not present -0.12 6.1
Gender (=1 if girl) 0.01 1.6 0.00 0.5
Constant 0.41 51.4 0.30 35.6 0.44 65.5
R-squared 0.18 0.20 0.19
Number of observations 7430 5387 7299
Note: The dependent variables take values between 0 and 1.
These regressions indicate that the socio-economic variables commonly
found to be associated with educational performance affect attainment via
parental interest and choice of peer group. Our finding that higher SES
groups show more interest in their children parallels direct estimates of
time allocation by Hill and Stafford (1974,80). The fact that lone mothers
and the parents of large families show reduced interest in each child is
16
consistent with a parental time constraint. This may not be the full story.
Hill and Stafford’s 1980 study shows that the direct time absorbed by
adolescents tends to be rather small (about 26 minutes for all mothers,
though 60 for women who have been to university). It may be that, in
some circumstances, large numbers of children or the absence of a spouse
make it difficult, for reasons unrelated to time, to establish discipline
about such things as homework. Note that working women show no less
interest in their adolescent children. Feinstein et al (1996) find in these
data that, if a women is working when her child is 7, or if she has ever
worked over the preceding 7 years, she is reported as showing lower
interest. This presumably reflects a time constraint. If we interpret
parental interest as a genuine measure of parental input, we conclude that
this input is lower for women who work when their children are young
but not when their children are older. This accords well with Hill and
Stafford’s (1980) finding that working women spend substantially less
time with younger children.
Endogeneity issues
In the estimates presented only the initial score at 11 has been
instrumented. We have argued above that parental interest and all the
variables classified as peer group inputs in Table 2 could be considered
as endogenous. Table 4 (columns 3 and 4) gives the results of treating
them as such using Local Authority area dummies as extra instruments. A
Sargan specification test provided some legitimacy for this larger
instrument set: we do not reject orthogonality of instruments and residuals
from the instrumented equations for any of the three attainment measures
at the 10% level.
To assess the effect of instrumentation, Table 4 also contains the
estimates from Table 2 where these variables were treated as exogenous.
We can thus perform tests similar to those of Hausman (1978) for the
change in the parameter when a variable is treated as endogenous. Our
base-line regression instruments only the score at 11 (for measurement
error). Because we are comparing two instrumental variables estimators,
17
we cannot assume that our base-line regression is efficient (Mroz, 1987).
The Hausman analysis requires this assumption for the computation of the
variance of the difference in estimators. However, if we assume that
measurement error is uncorrelated with our extra instruments in the
second regression (Local Authority dummy variables and lagged parental
interest) then the simple Hausman technique does apply. The t-statistics
reported in column 5 are calculated according to this assumption. 
Instrumenting the peer group variable leads to much increased standard
errors but the point estimates are nearly unchanged. Thus, counter to
Evans et al (1992), we do not reject the null hypothesis that peer group
is exogenous. This holds not only for the main peer group variable, but
also for school type and presence in the high stream. Parental interest
appears to control for some of the potential endogeneity bias.
We do reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of parental interest two
times out of three. Instrumentation increases the parameter on parental
interest suggesting the source of endogeneity: parents show more interest
if their children do unexpectedly badly. This supports the ‘something
must be done’ hypothesis discussed in Section 2. An alternative
explanation for the increase in the parameter on instrumentation is that
parental interest measures with error the underlying parental factor input
to attainment.
Overall, there does not seem to be a lot of endogeneity bias for peer
group and school type variables. Indeed, the only strong effect of
instrumentation is on the initial score variable, as discussed above. Given
early attainment, parents do not seem to choose peer groups and schools
in such a way as to generate important endogeneity. It must be
remembered that this evidence dates from the early seventies. Active
parental choice may have been relatively restricted or unimportant for
most of the population. It is also true that, at the time, there was
considerable restructuring of the education system, in such a way that
many of the school-type variables could have been determined effectively
as random experiments. 
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Table 4: Treating Key Variables as Endogenous in the Attainment Equation
Variables treated as t-stat on
difference
Exogenous Endogenous
Estimate s.e. Estimate s.e.
Parental interest
C Reading 13.22 2.56 26.42 6.82 2.1
C Maths 10.11 2.16 12.63 5.90 0.5
C All Exams 21.59 3.18 41.21 8.53 2.5
Peer Group
C Reading 7.57 2.23 6.84 5.28 0.2
C Maths 6.67 1.88 7.43 4.93 0.1
C All Exams 9.32 2.76 11.12 6.58 0.3
High stream
C Reading 4.06 0.75 4.09 2.31 0.0
C Maths 5.59 0.62 7.71 2.03 1.1
C All Exams 5.98 1.07 4.14 3.05 0.6
Private school
C Reading 2.34 1.92 -0.25 6.05 0.5
C Maths -0.37 1.43 -0.63 5.06 0.1
C All Exams -0.03 2.36 3.08 7.21 0.5
Grammar school
C Reading 5.92 1.32
 
7.82 3.56 0.6
C Maths 2.90 1.05 7.63 2.93 1.8
C All Exams 6.73 1.62 11.18 4.34 1.1
Secondary Modern
C Reading -3.64 0.81 -2.33 1.79 0.8
C Maths 0.73 0.68 -1.34 1.55 1.5
C All Exams -1.91 1.00 -1.72 2.24 0.1
PTR
C Reading -0.16 0.15 -0.17 0.28 0.0
C Maths -0.02 0.11 -0.30 0.23 1.4
C All Exams -0.07 0.19 0.11 0.34 0.6
Note: The table describes the effects of making each of the seven tabulated variables
endogenous in the regressions in Table 2. The instruments were Local Authority
dummies, parental interest at 7 and early attainment.
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4.     CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we consider the influence of family, schooling and peer
groups on the development of children in the NCDS between the ages of
11 and 16. We estimate a structural model that provided a plausible
representation of linkages of family background variables, schooling and
peer group effects. It seems that satisfactory instruments are available to
handle endogeneity problems. In fact, we encounter less endogeneity than
is suggested by the literature surveyed in the introduction. PTRs seem to
have minimal effects on attainment at 16, consistent with recent research.
In common with other researchers, we find that peer groups have a
significant effect on attainment but we do not reject the exogeneity of the
peer group variable. Families select or determine peer groups in ways
associated with social class, family structure and parental education but
the peer group, rather than these background variables, then provides the
major input during the period between 11 and 16. Thus we confirm the
‘parents and peers’ theory of educational attainment for children in
British secondary schools, as emphasised by Robertson and Symons
(1996) for children in primary schools.
The major channel through which family background variables
influence attainment is parental interest. This dwarfs the direct effects of
parental education and class, but is itself strongly correlated with these.
The involvement of parents in the secondary education of their children
has an important effect on continued development, presumably through
motivation, discipline and support.
Sallis (1987) shows how the 1986 Education Act strengthened earlier
measures to reinforce parental interest over schools. Sallis discusses the
shift in education policy from paternalism to consumerism, arguing that
schools and parents are constrained in the development of partnerships by
professional resistance to dialogue with parents. Our findings suggest that
the more parents can be brought into involvement with their children’s
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